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“We don’t have this is mine and this is his”: managing money and the 
character of conjugality in Kenya 
 
Abstract 
 
In the context of calls for more nuanced understanding of marriage as a dynamic institution, 
this paper addresses a gap in the literature on intra-household financial management.  It 
examines financial management systems and levels of co-operation among 51 married 
couples in Kenya.  It first presents a typology of intra-household financial management 
arrangements and then examines how this relates to the nature of co-operation between 
couples.  It reveals a wide spectrum of co-operation which highlights the neglected case of 
strong co-operation, which is found to be more frequent among younger couples.  There is 
some evidence that this is the result of changing ideologies towards companionate marriage 
but there is also evidence of life-cycle influences which result in declining co-operation over 
time.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
  
Feminist economists and anthropologists broke open the ‘black-box’ of the household some 
thirty years ago.  Captured by the concept of the ‘conjugal contract’ (Whitehead 1981), they 
focused on the structure of contributions and responsibilities, entitlements and claims, and 
the subordinate position of women in the household that these reflected and reproduced.  
This gave rise to a debate over the dynamics of co-operation through the development of 
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economic models of negotiation and bargaining, most notably in Sen’s analysis of ‘co-
operative conflicts’  (Sen 1990).  More recently these approaches have been criticised as 
giving too much weight to structure over agency and space has been opened up for the 
analysis of marriage as a dynamic institution rather than a ‘co-operation puzzle’  (Jackson 
2012c:1). Nevertheless, this move is situated within a critical perspective on modernisation 
so as to overcome ‘feminist queasiness’ (ibid: 2) with overly positive analyses of change in 
the face of processes that produce complex and varied outcomes and persistent gender 
inequalities.   
 
This paper contributes to this area by addressing a gap in the anthropological and 
sociological literature:  it focuses on how financial management takes place in married 
couples and examines how this relates to co-operation.  How money is managed in the 
household has been a focus of sociological literature in developed countries and the UK in 
particular, but hardly at all in an African, or more broadly developing country, context.  The 
latter literature focusses on resource management (see also (Singh and Bhandari 2012) 
although rural households have long been engaged in the cash economy and processes of 
de-agrarianization and livelihood diversification (Bryceson, et al. 2000) create dependence 
on markets and consumption goods which make financial management of ever greater 
significance .    
 
Addressing this gap from the perspective of conjugality is appropriate for two reasons.  First, 
in economies where subsistence production is declining, the management of money - and 
the emergence of new forms of technology and money – such as e-money (Maurer 2012)- 
offers new opportunities for agency and ‘e.g. .  for holding funds more safely, secretly and 
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inaccessibly from husbands (Morawczynski 2009) (and presumably also vice versa). .  
Second, economic conditions are co-evolving with social conditions and the noted rise of 
ideologies of romantic love and companionate marriage including in Africa (Thomas and 
Cole 2009; Wardlow and Hirsch 2006).  These raise further questions about the relationship 
between money, material exchange and affect.  The use and management of money in 
marriage is therefore a further prism through which to examine such changes.   
 
The next section briefly reviews the emergence of the new focus on the ‘character of 
conjugality’ (Jackson 2012c:3) and the literature on companionate marriage in Africa before 
turning  to the literature on money in marriage in Africa and the UK.  The context and 
methodology of the research are explained.  The empirical findings are then presented: first, 
I describe patterns of financial management among couples using a typology adapted from 
the UK literature.  This reveals the prevalence of independent management where both 
have income streams and expenditures are allocated to individuals alongside these.  Second, 
the evidence on the spectrum of co-operation that underlies these clearly reveals that 
control is not directly related to systems of management.  While offering evidence for 
classic feminist concerns of conflict over circumstances such as polygyny, there is evidence 
of strongly co-operative behaviour which appears to go beyond accepted norms and has 
been a neglected focus of analysis.  I then examine factors that can help explain this 
spectrum.  There is some evidence that strong co-operation is greater among younger 
compared to older couples.  Further exploration suggests that the association with younger 
couples is in part a result of the companionate marriage ideal, but that this is working 
alongside  - and is difficult to disentangle from - a life-cycle dynamic in which the extent of 
co-operation also changes as roles and responsibilities change with age.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Conjugality: From contracts to ‘character’  
 
Feminist economic anthropology has demonstrated the complex intra-household 
arrangements involved in rural household resource management – especially in Africa - 
where complex norms of land ownership and use combine with crop specificities and food 
provision in frequently polygynous and extended households.  Whitehead’s terminology of 
the ‘conjugal contract’ as the ‘terms on which husbands and wives exchange goods, incomes 
and services, including labour, within the household’ (Whitehead 1981:88) captured the 
‘observable and institutional arrangements by which women lose access to the resources 
they have produced themselves, or to equal shares in the household resources’ (ibid:88).  
She argued that relative power in the household to access income streams and resources 
was a result of both access to economic and financial resources in the labour market, and 
ideologies of caring and collective consumption within the household.  These  influenced 
women’s identification with sharing of their budgets whereas men’s control of resources 
and consumption was more individualized.  
 
The conjugal contract offered a focus on subordination that was a critique of economist’s 
models of the unitary household (Akram-Lodhi 1997; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003).  
Subsequently economists have tested collective models (Haddad, et al. 1994) including 
Sen’s model of co-operative conflict which used breakdown positions outside the household 
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as the key determinant of relative bargaining power (Sen 1990).  But these models in turn 
render the norms of the conjugal contract as somewhat fixed and feminist research has 
since then developed a better understanding of the scope for women’s agency (Kabeer 
1999; Rowlands 1997). Jackson criticises feminist research for disaggregating and 
differentiating men’s and women’s interests, and ‘and [seeing] marriage [as] largely a 
mechanism of subordination’,  arguing that ‘we should not lose sight of the shared interests 
of women and men in domestic groups, and the perceived and potential value of marriage 
to women’ (Jackson 2007:108).  Criticising the gender ‘myth’ of women as risk averse and 
marriage as a social relationship through which men exploit women, she explores examples 
of risk-taking in Zimbabwe and Zambia arguing that men’s responsibility for provision 
enables women to take risks with their own investments.  She calls for a more nuanced 
understanding ‘in which ambiguity, particular (re)interpretations of norms, exceptions and 
special circumstances, changing positions with ageing and with external conditions, and the 
ever-present yawning gap between stated and actual practice, offer fertile ground for 
‘creative conjugality’’ (ibid:126).    
 
In this view, marriage is an institution subject to forces of ideological, social and economic 
change  which allow greater space for marital relations to operate and the declining 
influence of wider structures of patriarchy such as familial ones (Jackson 2012a), even 
though analysis must be done in ways that do not assert couple’s insularity from these 
relationships (Cornwall 2002; O'Laughlin 2007).  This contrasts to Giddens’ view that the 
global standard for studies of marriage is the ideology of the ‘pure relationship’ of late 
modernity in which the need to stay together is dependent only on mutual satisfaction 
rather than material or social dynamics (White 2013).  , The anthropological literature finds 
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little evidence to support this ideological norm although it finds evidence of shifting 
discourses and practices which put greater stress on agency and intimacy (White 2013) or 
use of the ideal to disrupt social formation in locally specific ways (Wardlow and Hirsch 
2006).  
 
Moreover, Thomas and Cole (2009) challenge the idea that love is altruistic and hence that 
material and emotional exchange are necessarily at odds with each other, in line with 
analysis of how social meanings are created and transmitted through money exchange 
(Parry and Bloch 1989) including in intimate relationships (Zelizer 1997). They argue that the 
material must be understood as part of the affective but that money does have 
transformational effects which, in the context of more consumerist societies, lead to 
dilemmas and ambiguities with which people ‘constantly wrestle’ (ibid: 23).  In the context 
of male unemployment and migration, unmarried women seek multiple relationships in 
which material support is understood as constitutive of emotional commitment (Thomas 
and Cole 2009:24). This new emphasis on the diverse and changing nature of conjugality 
therefore opens space for further exploration of the role of financial arrangements.   
 
 
Explorations of money in marriage 
 
Anthropological research into the sphere of cash management indicates that single 
budgetary units are not created through ‘the literal pooling of cash, but through the ongoing 
process of bargaining about the organization of interpersonal transfers and responsibilities 
under shifting conditions’ (Guyer 1988:171).   Whitehead (1981) argues that in the case of 
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North-Eastern Ghanaian households there was a key conceptual boundary between 
subsistence and money in which men’s and women’s relationship to the commoditised 
economy differed and men were more able to hold onto their income while women are 
intent on ensuring food provision in the context of shortfalls.  This conceptual boundary can 
be seen as underpinning the gap between discourses of household provisioning and the 
reality of actual practice which has shown that women’s contributions to household 
provisioning are frequently under-played: whether in-kind as in rural Burkinabe (Thorsen 
2002) or in cash among urban and educated Nigerian households (Karanja-Diejomaoh 1978).    
Karanja-Diejomaoh (1978) reports that concerns about revealing incomes runs both ways in 
urban middle-class Nigeria:  men are concerned women will make claims on their incomes, 
disapprove of expenditures and try to control their financial activities;  while employed 
women did not want their husbands to know what they earned as they saw this as an 
invitation to them to shift their expenditure to their relatives and ‘outside wives’ (ibid:416).   
 
In her study of urban Kenyans, Stichter (1987) examined whether the entry of women into 
the formal labour market resulted in increased women’s decision-making in urban two-
earner couples in line with expectations of more companionate forms of marriage .  She 
found a trend towards ‘jointness’ in decision making and resource pooling among the 
middle income group but this was less evident among the lower income group.  But 
housework remained the woman’s domain and  may indicate somewhat reduced autonomy.  
While not representative of rural populations with few formal employment opportunities 
for women and finding rather low rates of formal polygyny in her study, she notes that it is 
impossible to assess the extent of ‘disguised polygyny’ and ‘outside wives’ with the 
likelihood that this operates more strongly among higher income men.   
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Except for Whitehead’s seminal contribution (1981) the UK literature in this field has largely 
evolved in isolation of each other  ((Singh and Bhandari 2012) is an exception).   Pahl (1989; 
1995) examined the role of both ideological and income and material factors influencing 
systems of financial management among married couples, in particular for their insight into 
systems of patriarchal control.  She explored this by producing a typology looking at issues 
of management (how it is handled on a day to day basis) and control (who has power and 
actually makes decisions over it) recognising that these were not co-terminous. This 
typology has subsequently been extensively used in the literature.  It has now evolved into 
two systems: one is dependent on the extent to which money is seen as jointly owned with 
individual autonomy subordinate to the needs of the collective unit and management is 
either joint or delegated to the man or woman.  The second second recognises the 
operation of separate individuals with independently owned money and where neither is 
entirely dependent on the other .   The second system is where they operate as more 
autonomous units with neither entirely dependent on the other, so that control is separated 
and management is either completely independent with each having expenditure 
responsibilities; or there is a partially pooled fund for collective expenses(Vogler 2009) . Pahl 
concluded (1989) that six factors affected these arrangements:  ideologies about gender 
roles, marriage and family; socio-economic variables of income, employment, class and 
education; expenditure responsibilities; psychological characteristics regarding money and 
skills in its management; practicalities of access to banks; and ‘cultural’ variables of 
generation, occupation and geography (ibid:122).  She emphasised the class-based variation 
in these arrangements, while also noting the effect of age and particularly co-operation 
among young couples in her review of historical archival material.  However, interestingly a 
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life-cycle aspect to these relationships was not further explored, rather giving analytical 
precedence to social structural factors.   
 
The evidence to date from research in the UK (Sonnenberg 2008) shows that the 
relationship between management and control depends on final decision making, and that 
greater management responsibility does not necessarily mean greater control.  In particular, 
patriarchal norms were found to be strong and female management was associated with 
low-income households where managing budgets creates greater challenges.  It is also 
found that control and management tends to be conferred on men as family income rises.  
At the same time breadwinning wives were likely to underplay their potential for greater 
control to uphold the notion of the breadwinning head of household.  Even where pooling 
occurs then women tend to restrict their access to pooled funds depending on notions of 
financial contribution and fairness – which in turn relates to men’s position in the labour 
market and higher wages.  Employed wives are found to be more family focused than men 
and devoting more of their earnings to children.  Moreover, separated management is now 
more frequent in the context of cohabitation, re-marriage and same-sex relationships, and 
with stages of the life-cycle and , satisfaction with relationships and life in general has been  
found to be associated with joint decision making in contrast to the suggestion that trends 
to greater individuation reflects moves to ‘pure relationships’ ((Giddens 1992) cited in 
(Vogler 2008:118)).   
 
With these two literatures in mind, this paper uses the categorisation of management 
systems as a practical entry point for the analysis.  In line with the developing country 
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literature’s concern over co-operation and conflict, I then develop the analysis using this 
focus because this resonates with an enquiry into the character of conjugal relationships.  .   
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
In seeking to examine sensitive topics which are nested in complex and specific household 
contexts and with complicated chains of causality,  semi-structured interviews are the only 
real option to explore the variation and processes involved. This paper therefore uses 
material from qualitative interviews which enquired into intra-household financial 
arrangements conducted as part of a wider project that examined the changing use of 
financial services among low income Kenyans.   
 
The research focused on three towns and their rural environs, chosen to represent terciles 
of Kenya’s district poverty rankings (according to GOK, KNBS 2006) and also therefore 
capturing cases from three ethnic groups.  Mathira (top tercile) on the slopes of Mt Kenya, 
which is ethnically Kikuyu, represents agro-ecologically higher potential zones with 
extensive small-holder tea and coffee production, while Nyamira (second tercile) also had 
small-holder tea and coffee but also areas of lower potential among the ethnically Gusii.  
Both of these locations have relatively high population densities and hence proximity to 
public services.  Kitui, (bottom tercile) is a semi-arid environment where population 
densities among the Kikamba ethnic group are low and service access difficult, and which 
experiences crop failure and food insecurity on a frequent basis with consequently high 
levels of male out-migration.  A survey instrument with a randomly chosen sample of 194 
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households and interviewing 337 individuals in them, was followed by a sub-sample of 148 
semi-structured interviews.  The sub-sample was chosen purposefully to ensure 
representation of different levels of income, age, household structure and extent of formal 
financial service use. The survey showed that main income sources (by individual) were: 
own agriculture, livestock and fishing (35%); employment in agriculture, casual labour or 
domestic chores (21%); own business (20%); public or private sector employment (11%) and 
pensions or transfers (11%).  56% fell below the $2.50 per day poverty line and 20% below 
$1.25 per dayi.    
 
This analysis uses 102 of the 148 semi-structured interviews where married partners in  in 
51 households were interviewed. .  This is  a relatively large sample for qualitative research 
which allows patterns to be identified though does not seek to make statistical inferences  
The couples were mostly co-resident and were interviewed separately.   Further interviews 
with women whose husbands worked away and we were therefore unable to interview, 
have been used as supplementary material to the main analysis.ii   
 
Respondents were asked open ended questions about how they managed their income 
streams, provisioning for the household and what kinds of discussion and issues arose with 
their partner.iii  They were also asked about the extent of co-operation over or joint use of 
financial services.  In the majority of cases a male researcher interviewed the husband while 
a female researcher interviewed the wife at the same time.iv  Same sex translators also 
assisted as researchers were not necessarily fluent in local languages. 
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Researching how couples deal with money is a ‘potential minefield’  (Burgoyne and 
Sonnenberg 2009:103) and recently the role of discursive practices around money 
management and how it reflects on what this says about respondents as a couple has been 
recognised (Sonnenberg 2008).  In an African context, Jackson similarly highlights how de-
briefing participants after choice experiments constructed discourses of women’s 
subordinate roles although women had won out in the pool-sharing (Jackson 2012b).  She 
suggests that this allowed men to present ‘successful marital masculinity’ (p 787) and 
women to reinforce male status which men appreciate.  In this case, familiarity and rapport 
which had already been developed by the research team through the survey interviews 
(held two weeks earlier) undoubtedly improved the quality of discussion allowing many 
sensitive issues  to be discussed, and aspects of the discourse are noted in the discussion 
below.     
 
Early on we adjusted our approach from asking about areas of agreement and disagreement 
which was too sensitive to asking about different priorities and how these were resolved.  
Separate interviews of spouses addressed concerns about individuality and confidentiality 
but raised issues regarding consistency of reports both in terms of what is objectively 
reported aswell as their subjective views of levels of co-operation such that in a number of 
cases the consistency between the spouses’ accounts was low or even directly 
contradictory. The approach to analysis has therefore recognised similarities and differences 
in accounts as part of understanding the separation of monies and levels of transparency 
and co-operation involved.  Given these problems, it might in future be useful to consider 
interviews both separately and together (see for example (Dema-Moreno 2009)), in order to 
get a better perspective of the couple’s dynamics and identify  discursive practices.   
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However, whichever approach, is taken it is also of course possible that they had agreed on 
a narrative to offer to the research team in advance although in-depth probing of responses 
made these harder to sustain.  Nevertheless a couple of individuals gave us ‘hard luck’ 
stories that there was little other evidence to support and I consequently treat these cases 
with caution while not excluding them from the analysis.   
 
The analysis below categorises management systems using an adapted version of Pahl’s 
typology and through this discussion explains the livelihood context.  I then described the 
basis of a three-fold classification of co-operation which allows the spectrum of co-
operation to be discussed:  weak/discordant; medium and strong.    Arriving at an overall 
assessment of these criteria necessarily involves some subjectivity on the part of the 
researcher in weighing the evidence.   
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Intra-household financial management systems  
 
The typology of intra-household management systems used is given in Table 1 (and 
represents a range from separate to shared management.  The first and most prevalent 
system is independent management – where couples retain income separately and each has 
expenditures they are responsible for spending this income on.  The second is independent 
management with variable housekeeping where the husband gives the wife funds but this is 
not a fixed amount.    Male management is where he manages all the funds for the 
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household usually from a range of work and enterprises, and she has no income.  Female 
management captures two cases where the wife earned in the context of the husband being 
unemployed.  Finally is pooling where all income is shared and both have access.   
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Table 1:  Intra-household financial management systems by location 
Management System Mathira Nyamira Kitui Overall 
Independent management 9 15 8 32 
Independent management with 
variable housekeeping 
1 1 4 6 
Male management 1 1 6 8 
Female management  0 2 0 2 
Pooling 2 1 0 3 
Total 13 20 18 51 
 
Consistent with earlier work (------, 2004)  ,independent management is the dominant 
system across the three sites.  It is men’s overall responsibility to provide for the household 
and, on the whole they retained responsibility for major items of expenditure related to the 
farm, school fees and of course their own business activities.  They frequently allocate 
specific income streams to the wife to purchase the basic household and kitchen items and 
‘to minimise the money that she asks from [him]’ (611/1).v   
 
It is particularly the case that daily income from milk or monthly incomes from tea are 
allocated to women for these purposes.  For example,  women pick tea on patrilineal plots 
(in Mathira and Nyamira) close to the houseas this is convenient and involves a couple of 
hours work in the morning followed by a trip to take the leaves to the local buying centre.  
Therefore she knows the quantity produced and women frequently emphasise that they see 
the tea earnings slip which are sent monthly.  However, men tend to retain control over the 
annual bonus which is the largest part of the payout, although women frequently have a say 
in its use.  Given these dynamics it is now increasingly common for women to have their 
own tea ‘numbers’ – i.e. accounts with the tea factory and this particularly occurs if women 
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do not feel they are getting adequate access to the incomevi  With buying centre officials 
often supporting these claims, so creating additional pressure on men to give women voice 
in the use of the income.  Hence, where incomes are the result of joint labour (men 
frequently undertake heavier tasks and apply inputs) or joint assets (eg rental housing) 
women are now much more entitled to know about and negotiate over the use of them and 
men’s overall control has gradually declined.   
 
 
Traditionally women had their own crops and responsibility for providing relish to go with 
staple foods provided by the man, and she could also sell these to meet her own needs (----
,2004).  With falling land sizes,  another approach to providing a woman with her own 
income stream is to enable her to start a business.  This is a strategy to make housekeeping 
funds go further as the funds produce some return and alleviate the husband from the 
responsibility of daily provision - a strategy also found in Malawi (------, 2005) and 
historically in West Africa as a means of establishing multiple wives in household units 
(Karanja-Diejomaoh 1978) .  However, even then under independent management, she will 
not necessarily be able to cover all the household expenses and, since it is still his 
responsibility to provide, she may instead refer to this as ‘chip(ping) in’ (909/1) when he is 
unable to manage rather than an important part of provision.  This terminology involves 
both a greater idea of ownership of that income stream compared to an on-farm stream, 
but also retains a strong idea of subordinate status.   
 
Independent management can therefore involve very different relative levels of husband 
and wive’s income. A small number of women went out to do casual labour simply in order 
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to pay their monthly women’s saving group contribution of a couple of hundred shillings.  At 
this very low level where the husband is still the main provider, the gradation between 
independent management and male management is therefore thin.  Consequently, in many 
of these cases there was still a need for daily discussion between them of what was needed 
in the household and given the unpredictability of incomes the relationships behind the 
daily discussion is one that gives a strong insight into the character of the relationship.   
 
It is norm for men not to disclose the incomes from their individual sources:  ‘a woman 
should not know how much the husband earns because when they do, they come with 
budgets of salon, shoes and other things’ (907/1).  But nor do men necessarily expect 
women to reveal what they have earned in their business or daily labour as ‘women have 
numerous needs’ (211/1).  Women often do seek to ensure that men do know when they 
receive substantial amounts of money as in the case of a ROSCA payout since ‘if there is a 
new sofa set then he will ask from where!’(909/2), indicating the importance of allaying 
fears that they may be receiving money from other men.   
 
Nevertheless, transparency varies and does not necessarily result in agreement.  One young 
man reported that he informed his wife of the money he makes, but she complained that he 
could never give her more than Kshs500 and would not buy items in the quantities she 
wished even when he had more, by arguing that there should be some left for 
‘eventualities’.  She complained that he would then go and drink some of what remained – a 
situation she would ‘bear with’ (812/2).  At the other end of the spectrum, a young man 
who was running four motor-cycle taxis (boda boda) and trading in livestock demonstrated 
complete transparency with his wife reporting ‘we don’t have this is mine and this is his’ 
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(506/2). He gave her his daily earnings to look after before taking them to the bank monthly 
(still independent management) but she was clearly very proud of this which in turn 
indicated how it breached the norm.   
 
The second most used system of male management, was where women had no income 
stream and was rather more common in Kitui than elsewhere.  This was because the woman 
was sick, taking care of small children or working only on their own farm and not selling 
produce from it because it was inadequate for their own consumption.  Additionally, the 
poor rains in the last couple of years had resulted in very limited farm labour opportunities 
for women.   
 
Two cases of female management arose in Nyamira where the husband was unemployed: 
one a young man who had lost his job due to injury and the couple were struggling to live on 
her meagre earnings working in a salon so they discussed expenditure in detail.  Another 
was a much older man who had returned home have lost his job during the 2008 post-
election violence and appeared unable to adjust to the new situation leaving his wife to 
provide from the farm and taking no interest at all.   
Cases of pooling were only three but are interesting because they involve different 
approaches but clear transparency.  Two were young couples mainly dependent on casual 
or low paid farm labour.  One couple pooled the funds daily which meant telling each other 
what they had earned and discussing what to do with it; the other had her weekly income 
and his monthly income and they recounted incredibly consistently their discussion of how 
each was used.  The third was a married couple who worked together from home as tailors.  
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They literally pooled the funds in a drawer from which either took money to either buy 
materials or household needs – the only case of actual cash pooling.   
 
This categorization of management systems confirms the predominance of independent 
management and the discussion also confirms how these operate with very varied degrees 
of co-operation such that independent management is by no means co-terminous with 
greater disagreement and autonomy and nor is male management co-terminous with 
complete male autonomy in decision making.  While it was clear that men retained a degree 
of ultimate authority and control over resources which influenced how their wives engaged 
with them, it was also clear that social norms about how they exercised this control 
presented instances of co-operation in negotiation and agreement. The next section 
explores this in greater depth.  
 
Co-operation and management  
 
This section assesses the narratives on the basis of the following criteria:  first, the reported 
extent of their discussion about household provisioning and the extent to which a husband 
fulfilled his responsibilities to provide with little need for insistence or intervention by the 
wife; second, the evident transparency of how much each knew about each other’s financial 
service use and degree of co-operation over this; and third, overt expressions of how much 
they trusted each other over the use of funds (such statements being made by both men 
and women).     The spectrum of cases is wide, and the criteria have been used to identify 
three broad categories of co-operation:  weak/discordant; medium and strong .  Table 2 
gives the distribution of these cases by location and management system.  
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First are cases where the couple were co-operating weakly or were discordant in their 
dealings.  They are reasonably well distributed by location, and most cases are within 
independent management systems as would be expected.  The cases range from instances 
of clearly expressed antagonism or disaffection which meant that managing basic daily 
requirements was often a problem, through to instances where there was lack of 
transparency and couples did not even report accurately what each other’s main income 
earning activities were.  At their most discordant, four cases involved the marital 
relationship itself:  two were cases of polygynous marriage, while a third involved the anger 
of the wife over another woman; and a fourth involved a man who (we came to learn) had 
had an affair and reported to us that he did not want ‘joint financial dealings’ with his wife.  
Only one case involved allegations that funds needed for the family were drunk.  In others 
there was a clear lack of knowledge or trust in the other; an expression of non-belief in the 
husband’s stated position of funds availability; persistent disagreement over some element 
of the household budget; or apparent resignation by the wife to the situation of his ultimate 
control over the finances.   Indeed, as table 2 shows, three of these cases involved male 
management systems.  The situations here involved one case where he claimed she did not 
manage funds well so managed the expenses himself; but another where she was clearly 
critical of her husband’s lack of a stable income source claiming there was no income to 
discuss while he reported that they discussed the budget monthly.  In this case he said that 
if she refused his proposals he toed the line because ‘a mother can mobilise children against 
the father until he becomes the only bad figure in the home’ which not only confirmed her 
dissatisfaction with his contribution (706) but which also expressed her ability to resist and 
subvert.    
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 Table 2:  Levels of co-operation by location and management system  
Level of co-operation Weak/Discordant Medium Strong Total 
By location     
Mathira 3 6 4 13 
Nyamira 6 7 7 20 
Kitui 4 8 6 18 
By management system     
Independent 
management 
7 15 10 32 
IM with variable 
housekeeping 
2 2 2 6 
Male management  3 4 1 8 
Female management  1 0 1 2 
Pooling 0 0 3 3 
Totals 13 (25%) 21 (42%) 17 (33%) 51 
 
 
The category of medium co-operation represents cases where the conjugal contract of 
predominantly male provisioning is largely being adhered to while women accept or 
negotiate their way through these arrangements with varying degrees of vigour or 
acceptance. This resulted in relatively successful and significant co-operation in resource 
allocation, often with the husband supporting her or clearly responding to her suggestions 
and input, but none of these cases involved complete transparency over what was earned 
on either side.  The cases are again reasonably proportionately distributed across locations 
and in relation to the management system.  Most again involve independent management 
though with slightly more male management cases. 
 
Nevertheless, the extent of discussion and agreement still ranged markedly.  Sometimes 
there was a clear pattern of responsibilities and little need for discussion as he reliably 
provided and she expressed satisfaction with the way funds were used and that she would 
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‘let him take control’ (115/2).  Areas such as food and school fees were invariably the 
easiest to agree on while larger priorities for expenditures such as house construction might 
be areas of disagreement since he might prioritise other issues such as income earning 
ventures.  In other cases women reported that they could influence their husbands.  
However, there can also be areas of disagreement that are recognised but these do not 
result in falling out (as it did in the weak/discordant cases).  In a few cases women 
expressed that they had not consulted their husband or had gone outside the parameters of 
their agreements.  For example, one had ordered children’s clothes that had not been 
budgeted and he therefore refused to use their harvest to pay so she did additional labour 
to purchase them.  The wife of a couple who were both teachers admitted borrowing from 
her savings and credit co-operative beyond what he had agreed to and using these funds in 
a venture to purchase cars to be hired out which then failed.    
 
The cluster of four male management cases reflects the situation where women have no 
income source independent of the man’s but this can produce very contrasting situations  
illustrating how it did not mean his control ran unchecked.  While in one they regularly 
discussed and agreed the household budget, the man did not wish his wife to know exactly 
what his income was because she might make further claims,  and another gave his wife 
funds to keep but continually checked what she had left.  In the other two, husbands clearly 
expressed their wife’s ability to influence allocation:  one saying he would let an issue ‘die 
off’ if his wife didn’t agree (805/1) and another that ‘if an idea doesn’t make my wife happy I 
drop it’ (902/1).  
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In the very co-operative category cases are characterised by higher levels of trust and/or 
transparency which is often overtly expressed, and for which financial management 
practices provide supporting evidence.   This does not mean there is no disagreement over 
allocation but that they respected each other when they disagreed and did not go behind 
each other’s backs or proceed regardless of the other partner.  As one husband put it: ’if 
one does anything by force he/she ends up hurting himself…people have to reason 
together’ (708/1). In a similar vein a man running a panel beating business who had set up 
his wife in a car spare parts business reported that they can disagree on setting priorities 
but not to quarrelling stage ‘men take things lightly…unlike ladies’ (913/1).   For example, 
one couple in their thirties had recently disagreed about the secondary school to send their 
son to as she wanted him to go to a more expensive one.  She explained that she had 
prevailed and that ‘someone has to bend low for the other to be a winner’.  Moreover, this 
progressiveness appeared to be reflected in practices as she explained: ‘[my account] is my 
money; but his account is our money’ (418/2).    Or again, as in the case of the title of this 
paper:  ‘we don’t have this is mine and this is his’ where the husband gave his earnings to 
his wife to keep for him.  She knew and discussed with him what was to be done with them 
although he retained ultimate control and had decided to go ahead and buy motorcycles as 
taxis, although she was concerned about the risks of injury.   
 
On the other hand, strongly co-operative cases were also evident where women had more 
reliable income streams than their husbands.  In one,  where they depended on her small 
income from salon work and had a small child, they had to be very careful and so discussed 
all expenditure.  In another, the woman was a nurse at the local private maternity hospital 
and she explained how she was careful to inform him if she had spent on something that 
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was not agreed - such as an ‘interesting clothe in the market and you cannot leave it there!’ 
(601/2).  So that while exercising some autonomy as a result of feeling that the funds were 
her own, she at the same time was tending to underplay the power this role gave her and 
recognising his ultimate authority (see also Silberschmidt, 1999).   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the three cases of the pooling management system fall into the 
strong co-operation category demonstrating it to be a special case.  One of these was a 
newly married couple who were very strong Seventh Day Adventists and explained down to 
the last shilling their tithing contributions and their approach to managing household 
requirements with the husband emphasising that ‘discussing financial issues is very vital in 
enhancing family unity. ...When you put God in family issues then the family affairs will be 
very smooth and successful...’ (112/1).    
 
Only one case of strong co-operation fell in the male management category and was where 
the husband was sole provider in a poor young couple because the woman had incurred an 
injury to her arm and had not been able to do agricultural work and also recently given birth 
to a child. He was willingly assisting in paying her group contributions, which - given their 
precarious income as he was dependent on daily labour - justified the strong co-operation 
category as these are frequently seen as a woman’s own choice and hence responsibility.   
 
This analysis has clearly demonstrated the diversity of levels of co-operation underlying 
financial management arrangements and offered greater insight into the extent of male 
control.  At the discordant end of the spectrum, examples strongly suggest that it is issues in 
the relationship such as polygyny and affairs that then affect how provisioning is practiced 
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as well as perceived by the wife.  It has highlighted how at the strongly co-operative end of 
the spectrum are cases of joint strategizing and support.  The distribution of cases is not 
particularly strongly associated with locations - and hence socio-cultural contexts. Nor do 
they strongly converge with levels of co-operation other than in the case of pooling.  The 
instances of strong co-operation suggest that, even while incomes may be managed 
separately, there are processes of change that are rendering men’s ownership and control 
of their own incomes and property less rigid.  In particular women’s rights to land and 
property were a controversial focus of debate over the new constitution finally passed in 
2010 (Cooper 2012) which has ultimately enshrined non-discrimination.  Alongside the 
National Land Policy (2009) and a landmark legal case of 2008 (Ntutu) which affirmed  land 
inheritance by daughter’s against tradition (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and UN Women 2013), these reflect an underling shifting environment regarding 
women’s treatment in property rights which can also be expected to influence norms 
regarding  of income management.   
 
In arriving at these findings, there was also suggestive evidence that stronger norms of co-
operation arose with younger couples.  The next section therefore explores the relationship 
between levels of co-operation and age in more depth.  
 
 
 
 
Examining age and co-operation  
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Table 4 also categorises couples by age and level of co-operation.  It suggests that in the 
youngest group weak/discordant cases are relatively fewer than in other age groups and 
strong co-operation is proportionately much higher.   Among medium co-operation medium 
cases are proportionally most numerous among the middle age group, and in the highest 
age group  - with the caveat that is has fewer cases overall – it has the lowest proportion of 
strong co-operation cases and highest proportion of weak/discordant cases.   
 
Table 3:  Levels of co-operation by age  
By age 
(row %s) 
Weak/ 
Discordant 
Medium Strong Total 
Young couples (both 
under 35)  
3 
(15) 
7 
(35) 
10 
(50) 
20 
Middle  
(both under 45, one may 
be under 35)) 
5 
(26) 
10 
(53) 
4 
(21) 
19 
At least one over 45 5 
(42) 
4 
(33) 
3 
(25) 
12 
Totals 13 21 17 51 
 
This evidence suggests the view that degrees of co-operation may change over the life-
cycle.  This can be explored from two perspectives.vii  First, as suggested by the literature, 
this could be arising from shifting norms of conjugality  with younger couples operating with 
enhanced ideologies of sharing in both access and decision making.   However, there was 
also evidence that early marriage was a stage of strong co-operation for some but also of 
fragility for others which these ideologies might also, in turn, exacerbate.  Combined with 
evidence that co-operation was less strong among older couples, this therefore suggests 
that a life-cycle dynamic may also be at work.   
28 
 
 
Indication that norms may be changing towards expectations of greater sharing of decisions 
over material resources amongst younger couples was most clearly evident in two of the 
cases already cited above: ‘we don’t have this is mine and this is his’ (506/2) and even more 
progressively by the woman who indicated ‘[my account] is my money; his account is our 
money’ (418/2).  This was however not uniform, for example, the young woman salon 
worker who while co-operating strongly over household expenditure expressed the view 
that she certainly did not want to share a bank account with her husband because ‘men are 
men and they can always disagree on anything’ (621/2).   
 
Previous research (___, 2004) has show that early stages of marriage are a time of 
vulnerability on both sides. Young women may return home as a means of having her 
husband sanctioned by family and elders over his womanizing or drunken behaviour; and 
young men are afraid that their wives would leave if they were allowed to go to the market 
for business where they could meet other men.  In this research these dynamics were 
illustrated by a young woman in this sample whose husband was working in Nairobi through 
contacts of his cousin (and who we were unable to interview).  She explained that she 
‘feel(s) a lot of pain’ (810/2) because she thought he was earning more and not sending her 
funds, on which she was heavily dependent because of drought .  She also compared her 
situation with others nearby where young migrant husbands were building good houses and 
buying livestock.  The implicit suspicion is that he has another woman, though she did not 
directly express this.  This resulted in a dispute in which the husband accused her of having 
an affair with his cousin when the cousin returned home.  She decided to leave and return 
to her parents so that he would have to make these allegations in front of them.  They were 
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both warned by her parents to behave and respect each other; he had to buy a goat to be 
slaughtered and eaten and she returned home with him.   This illustrates the tensions 
involved.  Her comparison with the material position of other young couples locally can be 
seen to clearly reflect expectations of co-operation in which the material dimensions are 
closely linked to the affective and in which their non-achievement can rebound to produce 
greater disaffection.  
 
Among young couples there was more diversity in the financial management systems used, 
in contrast to middle aged couples where independent management was the stronger 
pattern.  This appears to be associated with less well established differences in economic 
activities and hence income streams such that men’s are not so clearly dominant by 
comparison to women’s at this stage of the life-cycle.  This is more likely to result in 
economic pressures which precipitate greater co-operation.  However, this can then change 
dramatically over the life-cycle as men inherit land, develop businesses, or become more 
established in their trades so building their authority within the household.  Women 
increasingly face the constraints of income-generation alongside childcare through small 
business or which farm related income streams, so opening up larger earnings gaps. On the 
other hand, given that inherited farms get ever smaller, on-farm incomes are also under 
pressure and there is greater expectation and need for women to work off farm. By the 
stage where there are children and pressure on subsistence is even greater, men are also 
more confident that wives will not ‘take off’ with other men.     
 
At the older end of the spectrum, time and aging also produces specific conditions which 
can produce weaker co-operation.  Age differences between couples start to become 
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particularly relevant in older age also as the man may retire or be less able to undertake 
farm or outside work.  The mean and modal age difference in this sample was men being 
seven years older than the wife (who was interviewed) with a range of -3 to +20.  In only 
five couples were they the same age or the wife older though these were not confined to 
young couples.  One woman of 60, whose retired husband was 79 explained how he had his 
pension and had allocated her a tea plot so that she could manage her own needs.  She lived 
in a separate house which she reported that he had refused to assist with funds for 
renovation, but arranged labour for his tea plots, reporting that ‘there is nothing like 
discussing or arranging’ (218/2).  This shift in roles therefore underlies age differences in 
married couples.   
 
A further factor that arises with age is polygyny and ‘outside wives’.  Men’s capacity to take 
these can rise over time as they become better established in their economic activities.  In 
our sample the case of a 59 year old woman, wife of a 74 year old man was the second of 
three wives, the first having died.  While he appeared to be quite a successful livestock 
trader, he believed that he had allocated adequate farm income streams - including coffee - 
for her use.  This woman had been relying on one of her sons who had been a teacher and a 
significant source of financial support.  With his death, and the additional burden of one of 
her daughters leaving her husband and returning home with four grandchildren, she had 
greater need for funds but felt she could not ask him and greatly resented the third wife as a 
result.    
 
Examining the evidence of  strong levels of co-operation among younger couples compared 
with evidence of weaker co-operation in older couples, suggests that both life-cycle 
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dynamics and changing ideals around transparency and co-operation in financial 
management arrangements are at work. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has responded to calls for a more varied and nuanced understanding of marriage 
as a dynamic institution through an analysis of financial management among contemporary 
married couples in Kenya.  The paper has argued that trends towards de-agrarianization 
amidst technological change that is affecting financial service availability makes the 
understanding of financial management in the household of ever greater importance as an 
arena in which the dynamics of conjugality are played out.  Moreover, anthropological 
literature has found evidence for changing discourses and practices around agency and 
intimacy even if it does not go as far as a companionate marriage ideal of ‘pure 
relationship’.  Indeed, in an African context, and resonant with other literature in economic 
sociology, it has been argued that material exchange is constitutive of affective 
relationships.   
 
The paper has approached the analysis by adapting frameworks from the developed country 
literature into a typology for the Kenyan context.  In doing so it brings greater clarity to the 
diversity of arrangements that occur in practice while demonstrating the prevalence of the 
case in which men and women have incomes that they manage independently.  However, 
the degree of control exercised by men is by no means uniform and the analysis has 
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revealed a spectrum of co-operation ranging from discordant to strong.  While those that 
are more discordant reflect the contexts of relationships with which feminists have long 
been concerned such as polygyny and ‘outside wives’ these cases were a minority.   
Relationships which have been classified as presenting medium levels of co-operation were 
the largest category and also converged with the independent management norm, although 
also containing cases of male management.  One third of cases were categorised as strong 
co-operation because they demonstrated relatively high levels of trust and transparency 
with examples of how men expressed the need for the avoidance of quarrelling and 
disagreement.  Such a focus on the dynamics of strong co-operation has been missing from 
this literature to date.  
 
Strong co-operation was then explored in relation to age.   And found to be more associated 
with younger couples.  This can in part be explained as the result of immanent change in 
ideologies of co-operation as wider societal changes in gender norms and property rights 
occur.  But equally the early marriage stage of the life-cycle had its own vulnerabilities which 
such ideologies may be exacerbating.  This, combined with evidence from older couples 
suggests there is a life-cycle effect at work.  Indeed it even suggests that financial 
arrangements may be of particular importance among young couples in acting as a 
barometer of their relationship by capturing some of the interaction of material and 
emotional exchange.  This research indicates that greater attention to the analysis of 
financial management and a greater emphasis on the circumstances in which strong co-
operation arises present a neglected but fruitful focus for further exploring the dynamics of 
conjugal relations.  
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i  The Poverty Assessment Tool was used to estimate expenditure level and compare it to the poverty line, see 
www.poverytools.org.  
ii In cases where the husband was a migrant worker, there is a possibility that this may be caused by poor intra-
household relationships and hence mean that strong negative instances were excluded.  We could mainly expect 
that there would be a signal of this in the women’s interview.  Of the six households where the wife was 
interviewed  two indicated that there was some real breakdown of the relationship and the other four that there 
was regular provisioning by the husband and discussion of needs.  This evidence does not therefore suggest that 
these cases were strongly skewed towards discordant relationships and hence result in their under-representation  
iii The interview protocol is available in an annex online  Interview data is owned by FSD Kenya and application 
to access them can be made via the author. 
iv In 5 out of 51 cases the wife was interviewed by a male interviewer.  The concern here would be that they may 
under-report problems disagreements or lack of transparency and keen to present themselves and their 
relationship as compliant with social norms.  However, in four of these five cases the women reported either 
where they had disagreements or did not disclose issues to their husbands.  I therefore conclude that the 
interviewing was done sufficiently sensitively such that this was not a significant problem.   
v Bracketed numbers refer to the household code.  The number after the ‘/’ is 1 for husbands and 2 for wives.  
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vi Although in areas where the free market operates, this can also be used to avoid repayment of debts 
secured against the income.  
vii NB.  There is no obvious association between poverty levels and age in the sample.  
